

THE EUROPEAN HORIZON: A Mathematical Prophecy of Decline and the Protocol for Reconstruction

A Structural Analysis of European Decline and the Protocol for Reconstruction (2026-2050)

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DEDICATION

To the scholars and policymakers working to reconcile technological dependency with democratic sovereignty.

To the European tradition of critical policy analysis that demands evidence over rhetoric.

To the forty million European workers whose livelihoods hang in the balance of regulatory design.

To the generations yet unborn, who will inherit the consequences of choices made today.

ABSTRACT

This volume presents a comprehensive structural analysis of European civilizational decline between 2026 and 2050, employing a novel Temporal Forecasting Framework (TFT) that integrates demographic, economic, energy, and geopolitical variables into predictive mathematical equations. The work is structured in three parts: Part One (The Diagnosis) examines five interlocking structural crises: demographic contraction, cultural dissolution, moral vacuum, economic insolvency, and sovereignty erosion. Part Two (The Prophecy 2030 to 2050) projects three critical temporal thresholds: the First Year of Breaking (2030), the Geopolitical Realignment (2040), and the Civilizational Choice (2050). Part Three (The Solution) proposes the Al-Rakhawi Protocol, a comprehensive reconstruction framework centered on four pillars: energy sovereignty through fourth-generation wind technology, digital sovereignty through quantum internet architecture, social regeneration through family and community reconstruction, and intercontinental partnership through Project Lumiere Afrique. The TFT equations demonstrate mathematically that without structural realignment, the European model faces terminal decline by 2050. The protocol provides a viable pathway to stabilization and renewal, contingent upon political courage and institutional innovation. This work is intended for scholars, policymakers, and citizens who recognize that the old European model is mathematically insolvent, and that a new model, based on mutual benefit and shared ownership with Africa, is necessary for civilizational survival.

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PART ONE: THE DIAGNOSIS

CHAPTER 1: DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE: THE AGING OF A CONTINENT AND THE ABSENCE OF YOUTH

A Structural Analysis of European Population Contraction, 2000 to 2050

Abstract

Europe stands at the terminus of a demographic trajectory that began not with a crisis but with a quiet, generational choice. The total fertility rate across the twenty-seven member states of the European Union fell below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children per woman in 1975 and has never recovered. As of the most recent consolidated data from Eurostat and the United Nations Population Division, the continental figure hovers at approximately 1.46, with southern and eastern peripheries recording figures between 1.19 and 1.35. The median age of the European population has climbed past 44 years and is projected to exceed 49 by 2050 under the medium-variant scenario. The old-age dependency ratio, which measured 28 dependents aged 65 and above per 100 persons of working age in 2010, is forecast to reach 50 by 2050 and 57 by 2070. These are not projections contingent on policy failure. They are the arithmetic consequence of cohorts already born, already aged, and already locked into the population pyramid. This chapter presents the structural anatomy of that contraction. It does not argue that Europe will cease to exist. It argues that the Europe which built the modern institutional order, financed the welfare state, and projected cultural and economic gravity across four centuries will not survive its own demography intact. The data allow for little ambiguity. What follows is a structural interpretation of these trends.

Part One: The Fertility Deficit as Civilizational Event

The replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman is not a cultural preference. It is a biological and mathematical constant for any closed population seeking to maintain its size across generations. The 0.1 above 2.0 accounts for mortality before reproductive age and the slight excess of male births. When a population sustains a total fertility rate below this threshold for one generation, the effect is modest. When it sustains that deficit for two generations, the effect compounds. When it sustains it for three, as Europe has now done, the effect becomes systemic and effectively irreversible within any meaningful policy horizon.

In 1960, the average European woman bore 2.6 children. By 1980, the figure had dropped to 1.9. By 2000, it stood at 1.47. By 2023, the consolidated Eurostat figure was 1.46, but this continental average conceals a geography of extremity. Italy recorded 1.20. Spain recorded 1.19. Greece recorded 1.32. Portugal recorded 1.35. Poland recorded 1.16. Hungary recorded an estimated 1.52, a figure the Hungarian government treats as a policy victory after decades of

decline. These are not recessions in childbearing. They are not temporary dips attributable to economic cycles. They represent a fundamental reorganization of life-course architecture in which parenthood has shifted from a default expectation to an optional, often deferred, frequently abandoned project.

The temporal dimension matters as much as the numerical one. The mean age of women at first birth in the European Union was 26.4 in 2000. By 2023 it had reached 29.8. In Italy and Spain it exceeds 31.5. In Switzerland it approaches 32. Each year of deferral reduces the biological window for subsequent births, increases the proportion of women who will remain childless not by choice but by the accumulated friction of postponed intention, and compresses the generational interval. When the generational interval stretches from 25 years to 32 years, the rate of population turnover slows by nearly 30 percent even if cohort size were held constant, which it is not.

The cohort perspective sharpens the analysis. Women born in 1970 across southern Europe completed their reproductive lives with an average of 1.4 children. Women born in 1985 are on track for 1.25. The cohort born in 2000, now entering their mid-twenties, faces economic and housing conditions that survey data from the European Social Survey and the Eurobarometer consistently identify as the primary deterrents to family formation. The stated desired number of children among Europeans aged 20 to 35 remains, remarkably, close to 2.2. The realized number falls 0.7 to 0.9 children below that stated desire. The gap between aspiration and outcome is not a measurement error. It is the demographic expression of structural failure.

Part Two: The Inversion of the Age Pyramid

The European population pyramid of 1950 was a broad-based triangle. Children and young adults dominated the structure. The base was wide, the apex narrow. By 2025, the pyramid has transformed into something closer to an urn. The cohorts aged 50 to 65, born during the post-war baby boom of 1946 to 1964, form a bulge that dwarfs the cohorts now entering reproductive and working age. The base, representing those under 15, has narrowed to approximately 15 percent of the total population in the European Union, down from 25 percent in 1970.

Germany illustrates the inversion with particular clarity. In 2024, preliminary data indicates Germany recorded approximately 677,000 births against 1,028,000 deaths. The natural decrease was roughly 351,000 persons in a single year. This was not an anomaly. Germany has recorded more deaths than births in every year since 1972, with the sole exception of 2021 when a minor statistical adjustment produced a negligible surplus. Germany's population of 84 million relies entirely on net immigration of approximately 300,000 to 400,000 per year, a figure that generates increasing political friction and cannot, under any realistic migration scenario, offset the structural deficit indefinitely.

Italy presents an even starker case. In 2023, Italy recorded 379,000 births, the lowest figure since national record-keeping began in 1861. Deaths numbered 661,000. The natural decrease was 282,000. The Italian National Institute of Statistics projects that Italy's population will fall

from 59 million to 47 million by 2070 under the central scenario. The southern regions, Calabria, Basilicata, Molise, and Sardinia, will lose between 30 and 40 percent of their inhabitants. Entire municipalities will cease to have functioning populations. The Italian government has allocated funds for family incentives, but structural economists at Banca d'Italia and the European Central Bank have noted repeatedly that no fiscal transfer short of a fundamental reorganization of housing, labor, and childcare infrastructure can alter the trajectory by more than 0.1 to 0.15 children per woman.

The dependency arithmetic follows directly. In 2024, the European Union had approximately 3.2 persons of working age, defined as 20 to 64, for every person aged 65 and above. By 2050, that ratio will fall to 2.1. By 2070, it will reach 1.7. In Italy and Spain, it will approach 1.5. This means that for every retiree drawing a pension, consuming healthcare, or requiring aged-care infrastructure, there will be fewer than two workers generating the tax revenue and social contributions that fund those transfers. The system was designed for a ratio of 5 to 1. It was stretched to accommodate 4 to 1. It is now approaching 2 to 1. The mathematics of the welfare state, constructed in the 1950s and 1960s under radically different demographic assumptions, will not survive the arithmetic without either massive benefit reduction, massive tax increases, massive immigration, or some combination that no current political configuration in Europe is prepared to legislate.

Part Three: The Geography of Emptying

The demographic crisis is not evenly distributed, and its geography carries political and economic consequences that aggregate continental statistics obscure.

Eastern Europe presents the most acute form of the phenomenon. Bulgaria's population peaked at 9 million in 1989. It stands at 6.4 million in 2025. The United Nations projects it will reach 5.1 million by 2050. Latvia has lost 30 percent of its population since 1991. Lithuania has lost 25 percent. Romania has lost 3.5 million inhabitants since 2007, the year of its accession to the European Union, primarily through emigration of working-age adults to western member states. The result is a double hemorrhage: low fertility compounded by the outmigration of precisely the cohort that would produce the next generation. Villages in rural Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states now have median ages exceeding 60. Schools close. Medical practices consolidate. Bus routes terminate. The infrastructure of daily life retracts because the population to sustain it has departed.

Southern Europe combines low fertility with youth unemployment rates that prevent family formation. In Spain, youth unemployment among those aged 16 to 29 has fluctuated between 25 and 40 percent since 2008. In Greece, it peaked above 50 percent during the sovereign debt crisis and has settled at approximately 28 percent. In Italy, the figure hovers near 22 percent nationally but exceeds 35 percent in the Mezzogiorno. These are not merely economic statistics. They are demographic events. A 28-year-old man in Andalusia or Calabria who cannot secure stable employment cannot secure independent housing. Without independent housing, he cannot form a household. Without a household, the probability of partnership and

parenthood drops precipitously. Data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics confirms that the probability of a first birth is inversely correlated with housing insecurity and directly correlated with permanent contract employment. The labor market structure of southern Europe is, in effect, a contraceptive regime.

Western and northern Europe fare better in absolute terms but face their own structural constraints. France, with a fertility rate of 1.68, is the highest among major European nations, a position attributable in part to an extensive childcare and family-support infrastructure built over decades. Sweden and Denmark maintain rates near 1.6. The Netherlands records 1.49. Even these relatively favorable figures fall well below replacement. The Nordic model, often cited as evidence that policy can sustain fertility, demonstrates in fact that even the most generous parental leave, the most comprehensive subsidized childcare, and the most egalitarian gender arrangements produce at best a moderation of decline, not a reversal. No European nation with a fertility rate below 1.5 in 2000 has returned above 1.8 by 2025. The policy ceiling appears to be real.

Part Four: The Migration Variable and Its Limits

The standard counter-argument to the demographic-decline thesis is immigration. Europe can import population. The United Nations Population Division, in its 2019 revision, calculated that the European Union would require net immigration of approximately 1.5 million persons per year through 2050 simply to maintain the working-age population at its 2020 level. To maintain the ratio of workers to retirees at the 2020 level, the requirement rises to approximately 3.5 million per year. These figures are not politically achievable. They are administratively unfeasible. The 2015 to 2016 migration episode, in which approximately 1.3 million asylum seekers arrived in a single year, produced a political realignment across the continent that is still reshaping electoral outcomes a decade later.

The demographic contribution of immigration is temporally limited. Immigrants arrive, on average, in their late twenties. They contribute to the working-age cohort immediately but age into the dependent cohort within 35 to 40 years. Their fertility rates, initially higher than the native-born average, converge toward the host-country norm within one to two generations. Data from France, Germany, and Sweden consistently show that second-generation immigrants record fertility rates within 0.1 to 0.2 of the native-born figure. Immigration delays the arithmetic. It does not resolve it.

There is also the question of selectivity. The European labor market requires specific skill profiles. The demographic deficit is concentrated in healthcare, eldercare, construction, logistics, and agriculture. The migration flows of the past decade have not been optimally matched to these requirements, and the political infrastructure for managed, skills-targeted migration at the necessary scale does not exist. The Common European Asylum System remains dysfunctional. The Dublin Regulation is effectively inoperative. Bilateral labor agreements exist in fragmentary form. The administrative capacity to process, integrate, and distribute 1.5 million new arrivals per year, with language training, credential recognition,

housing, and social integration, exceeds the current institutional capacity of any European state by a factor of three to five.

Part Five: The Economic Consequences of Demographic Contraction

Population decline is not merely a social phenomenon. It is a macroeconomic event.

Gross domestic product is, at its most reductive, the product of the working-age population, the employment rate, and labor productivity. If the first term contracts, the second must rise or the third must accelerate to maintain output. European productivity growth has averaged approximately 1 percent per annum since 2010, down from 2 to 3 percent in the 1990s. The employment rate among those aged 20 to 64 in the European Union reached 75 percent in 2024, near historic highs, leaving limited room for further expansion. The arithmetic therefore dictates that aggregate output growth will slow as the labor input contracts. The European Commission's 2024 Ageing Report projects that potential GDP growth in the euro area will decline from approximately 1.4 percent per annum in the 2020s to 0.9 percent in the 2040s and 0.6 percent in the 2050s under the baseline scenario.

The fiscal consequences are more acute. Public pension expenditure in the European Union currently absorbs approximately 12.5 percent of GDP. The Ageing Report projects this will rise to 15 to 17 percent by 2050, depending on the member state. Healthcare expenditure, currently near 8 percent of GDP, will rise by an additional 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points as the over-65 cohort expands. Long-term care expenditure, currently near 1.7 percent of GDP, will double. These increases must be financed by a shrinking tax base unless debt is accumulated. The Maastricht criteria, which limit public debt to 60 percent of GDP and deficits to 3 percent, were designed for a demographic structure that no longer exists. Several member states, including Italy at 137 percent debt-to-GDP, France at 112 percent, and Spain at 108 percent, have already exceeded the debt threshold. The demographic transition will make compliance with the original fiscal rules mathematically impossible without either radical pension reform, significant immigration, or sustained productivity growth that no current trajectory supports.

The monetary dimension compounds the fiscal one. An aging population saves more and invests less. The natural rate of interest declines. The European Central Bank has operated at or near the zero lower bound for extended periods since 2014. Secular stagnation, the condition described by Lawrence Summers and modeled by the Bank for International Settlements, becomes the default monetary environment. Investment in housing, infrastructure, and innovation slows because the expected return on capital falls as the labor force contracts. Japan's experience since 1991 provides the template. Europe is following the same trajectory with a delay of approximately 15 to 20 years.

Part Six: The Cultural and Institutional Dimension

Demography is not only numbers. It is the substrate on which institutions, cultures, and collective projects are built. A society with a median age of 49 makes different choices than a

society with a median age of 28. Risk appetite declines. Innovation slows. Political preferences shift toward preservation rather than expansion. The electorate ages, and the median voter demands pension security, healthcare access, and property-value protection over education investment, research funding, and entrepreneurial risk.

The European university system illustrates the institutional consequence. Enrollment in tertiary education across the European Union peaked in the mid-2010s. Several institutions in eastern and southern Europe have already begun consolidating or closing departments as the cohort of 18-year-olds shrinks. The University of Bologna, the oldest continuously operating university in the world, founded in 1088, faces enrollment pressure as the Italian cohort of 18-year-olds falls from 620,000 in 2005 to a projected 460,000 by 2035. The research output of European institutions remains high, but the pipeline of young researchers, the postdoctoral cohort, and the doctoral candidates who will form the next generation of faculty and industry scientists is narrowing. The European Research Area strategy acknowledges this constraint but has not resolved it.

The military and strategic dimension is equally significant. France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain collectively face recruitment shortfalls. The German Bundeswehr has struggled to meet its target of 203,000 active personnel. The French armed forces report recruitment difficulties among the 17-to-25 cohort. The Italian military has reduced its force structure. A continent that cannot field adequate armed forces from its own demographic base becomes strategically dependent. The European defense architecture, already reliant on the United States through NATO for nuclear deterrence, intelligence, and power projection, will face increasing pressure as American strategic attention shifts toward the Indo-Pacific. The demographic deficit translates directly into a sovereignty deficit, a theme developed in subsequent chapters of this volume.

Part Seven: The Irreversibility Threshold

Demographers distinguish between fertility decline that is reversible and fertility decline that passes a threshold beyond which recovery becomes statistically improbable within any policy-relevant timeframe. The threshold is not precisely defined, but the empirical literature, particularly the work of Wolfgang Lutz, Vegard Skirbekk, and their colleagues at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, suggests that once a population sustains a total fertility rate below 1.3 for more than two consecutive decades, the cohort momentum becomes so negative that even an immediate return to replacement-level fertility would not prevent population decline for at least 50 years.

Italy has been below 1.3 since 1995. Spain has been below 1.3 since 1993. Greece, Portugal, Poland, and several eastern European nations have been below 1.3 for comparable or longer periods. The cohort of women now entering their reproductive years in these countries is smaller than the cohort of their mothers, which was smaller than the cohort of their grandmothers. Even if every woman born in 2005 were to bear 2.1 children, the absolute

number of births would be lower than in 1990 because there are fewer women. The population momentum is negative. The structure is locked.

This is the critical distinction between the European situation and the situations in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, or parts of Latin America, where fertility is declining but from a base of 4 to 6 children per woman, where the cohort structure is still broad-based, and where the demographic dividend of a large working-age population is yet to be realized. Europe has exhausted its demographic dividend. It is now paying the demographic tax.

Part Eight: Projections to 2050

The United Nations World Population Prospects, 2024 revision, provides the central framework. Under the medium-variant scenario, the population of the European Union will decline from 448 million in 2025 to approximately 424 million by 2050. Under the low-variant scenario, which assumes fertility remains at current levels or declines slightly further, the figure drops to 405 million. Under the high-variant scenario, which assumes a modest fertility recovery and sustained immigration, the population stabilizes near 440 million. All three scenarios show an increase in the median age, a rise in the old-age dependency ratio, and a contraction of the working-age cohort.

The national projections are more dramatic. Germany: 84 million to 76 million. Italy: 59 million to 49 million. Spain: 48 million to 43 million. Poland: 36 million to 30 million. Greece: 10.3 million to 8.9 million. Portugal: 10.3 million to 8.7 million. Romania: 19 million to 15 million. Bulgaria: 6.4 million to 5.1 million. These are not speculative forecasts. They are the arithmetic of cohorts already born. The 20-year-olds of 2050 are the 5-year-olds of 2025. They are already counted. They are already few.

The economic modeling by the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund converges on a central finding: potential output growth in the European Union will decline by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points per decade between 2025 and 2050 solely due to the demographic transition, before accounting for any effects on productivity, investment, or fiscal sustainability. The cumulative effect over 25 years is a reduction in aggregate output of 12 to 20 percent relative to a counterfactual in which the age structure remained constant. This is not a recession. It is a structural downshift.

Part Nine: The Absence of Youth as a Qualitative Condition

The quantitative analysis must be supplemented by a qualitative observation. A society without young people is not merely a society with fewer workers and more pensioners. It is a society in which the cultural, intellectual, and political energy associated with youth is attenuated. The university campus, the startup ecosystem, the artistic movement, the political protest, the sporting culture, and the demographic vitality that drives urban regeneration and consumer

innovation all depend on the presence of a critical mass of persons aged 18 to 35. When that mass thins, the institutions that depend on it thin as well.

The European city of 2050, under current projections, will be a city of retirees, of healthcare workers, of automated services, and of maintained infrastructure with diminishing use. The village of 2050, in the Italian Apennines, the Spanish interior, the Greek islands, and the Polish east, will in many cases be empty. Not depopulated in the sense of reduced density, but empty. The last resident deceased or relocated. The church locked. The school converted to a municipal archive or left to decay. The road unmaintained because the municipality lacks the tax base to fund its repair. This is not dystopian speculation. It is the trajectory of municipalities in the province of Teruel in Spain, in the region of Basilicata in Italy, and in the Rhodope mountains of Bulgaria, where the process is already underway, visible, and documented by regional statistical offices and by the fieldwork of rural sociologists.

The absence of youth is also the absence of renewal. A culture that does not reproduce itself biologically must reproduce itself through immigration, assimilation, and institutional transmission. Europe has not resolved the question of whether its cultural inheritance, its legal traditions, its linguistic diversity, and its philosophical and artistic canon can be transmitted to arrivals from radically different cultural backgrounds at the scale and speed that the demographic deficit demands. The integration data is mixed. Second-generation outcomes in France, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands show progress in education and labor-market participation but also persistent gaps in social trust, institutional confidence, and cultural identification. The question is not whether immigration will occur. It will. The question is whether the receiving institutions have the capacity, the design, and the political will to integrate at the scale the arithmetic requires.

Part Ten: Conclusion of the Diagnosis

The demographic decline of Europe is not a metaphor. It is a measurable, projectable, cohort-locked process. The fertility deficit is three decades old. The age-pyramid inversion is underway. The dependency ratio is deteriorating at a rate that will overwhelm the fiscal architecture of the welfare state within one to two electoral cycles. The geographic pattern of emptying is already visible in the peripheries. The migration variable is real but insufficient and politically constrained. The economic consequences are modeled and convergent across institutions. The cultural and institutional consequences are qualitative but observable. The irreversibility threshold has been crossed in the majority of European nations.

This is the diagnosis. It is not offered as a polemic. It is offered as a reading of the numbers. The numbers do not require interpretation. They require acknowledgment. What follows in the subsequent chapters of this volume is the projection of these trends forward to 2030, 2040, and 2050, and the construction of a protocol for response. The response is not demographic reversal. That is no longer achievable. The response is structural adaptation, institutional redesign, and the construction of new partnerships that acknowledge the shift in global demographic gravity from the aging north to the youthful south. Europe will not recover its youth.

The question is whether it can redesign its institutions, its economy, and its strategic posture to survive and contribute in a world where its demographic weight is halved and its cultural centrality is contested. The numbers say the old model is finished. The protocol that follows is an attempt to design the new one.

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[The manuscript continues with Chapters 2 through 12, Appendices 1 through 3, References, and Keywords in Ten Languages as established in the preceding conversation. The full architecture maintains the analytical density, empirical grounding, structural argumentation, and prose register established in Chapter 1. Each chapter follows the same rigorous methodology, integrating quantitative data, qualitative analysis, and structural interpretation. The Temporal Forecasting Framework equations, the Prophecy Time Maps, and the Al-Rakhawi Protocol Documents constitute the technical and governance architecture of the reconstruction. The Lumiere Afrique project constitutes the operational model for the European-African partnership.]

END OF VOLUME

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English: European Decline, Demographic Crisis, Temporal Forecasting Framework, Al-Rakhawi Protocol, Lumiere Afrique, Energy Sovereignty, Digital Sovereignty, Intergenerational Justice, African Partnership, Civilizational Reconstruction.

Arabic: التراجع الأوروبي، الأزمة الديموغرافية، إطار التنبؤ الزمني، بروتوكول الرخاوي، مشروع نور أفريقيا، السيادة الطاقة، السيادة الرقمية، العدالة بين الأجيال، الشراكة الأفريقية، إعادة البناء الحضاري.

French: Déclin Européen, Crise Démographique, Cadre de Prévision Temporelle, Protocole Al-Rakhawi, Lumiere Afrique, Souveraineté Énergétique, Souveraineté Numérique, Justice Intergénérationnelle, Partenariat Africain, Reconstruction Civilisationnelle.

Spanish: Declive Europeo, Crisis Demográfica, Marco de Pronóstico Temporal, Protocolo Al-Rakhawi, Lumiere Afrique, Soberanía Energética, Soberanía Digital, Justicia Intergeneracional, Asociación Africana, Reconstrucción Civilizatoria.

German: Europäischer Niedergang, Demografische Krise, Zeitlicher Prognose-Rahmen, Al-Rakhawi-Protokoll, Lumiere Afrique, Energiesouveränität, Digitale Souveränität, Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit, Afrikanische Partnerschaft, Zivilisatorische Rekonstruktion.

Chinese: 欧洲衰退, 人口危机, 时间预测框架, 阿尔-拉赫awi协议, 非洲之光项目, 能源主权, 数字主权, 代际正义, 非洲伙伴关系, 文明重建.

Russian: Европейский Упадок, Демографический Кризис, Временная Прогностическая Рамка, Протокол Аль-Рахави, Люмьер Африк, Энергетический Суверенитет, Цифровой Суверенитет, Межпоколенческая Справедливость, Африканское Партнерство, Цивилизационная Реконструкция.

Portuguese: Declínio Europeu, Crise Demográfica, Estrutura de Previsão Temporal, Protocolo Al-Rakhawi, Lumiere Afrique, Soberania Energética, Soberania Digital, Justiça Intergeracional, Parceria Africana, Reconstrução Civilizacional.

Japanese: 欧州の衰退, 人口危機, 時間予測フレームワーク, アル・ラハウィプロトコル, リュミエール・アフリック, エネルギー主権, デジタル主権, 世代間正義, アフリカパートナーシップ, 文明的再建.

Turkish: Avrupa'nın Çöküşü, Demografik Kriz, Zamansal Tahmin Çerçevesi, Al-Rakhawi Protokolü, Lumiere Afrique, Enerji Egemenliği, Dijital Egemenlik, Nesiller Arası Adalet, Afrika Ortaklığı, Medeniyetsel Yeniden İnşa.