Digital International Criminal Justice: A Legal Study on the Application of International Criminal Law in Cyberspace and Building a Global Humane Digital Criminal Justice System

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Preface

We live in a world witnessing a dangerous contraction in the systems of international criminal justice, where crimes against humanity are committed across digital networks, where perpetrators escape accountability due to the absence of a legal framework, and where victims are deprived of their right to justice because of the slowness of proceedings. Speaking of the law is no longer sufficient. It has become necessary to redefine criminal justice itself.

The modern court is not merely a tribunal in a hall but an intelligent network that interacts with victims in real time. With the emergence of artificial intelligence, the tool has arrived that international criminal jurisprudence has long dreamed of: the capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity in cyberspace before the damage occurs.

This work does not aim to repeat the traditional discourses of criminal law. It aims, rather, to build a new digital criminal legal theory that makes digital international criminal justice not a slogan but an enforceable principle. It combines precise jurisprudential analysis, deep legislative comparisons, and the study of real cases to present a practical solution that can be adopted in international forums, taught in the greatest universities, and relied upon in national and international courts.

This research has been built upon a simple but foundational principle: justice is not an end but a means to protect the victim from the digital crime. And without digital international criminal justice, there can be no genuine criminal justice in the digital age.

And with God lies all guidance and success.

Chapter One: Digital International Criminal Justice, From the Court to the New Legal Phenomenon

The concept of international criminal justice is no longer confined to the International Criminal Court or the achievement of justice. It has extended to encompass any digital act that leads to the prosecution of crimes against humanity in cyberspace. Digital international criminal justice is not merely the use of technology in achieving justice but a fundamental redefinition of the relationship of the international community with crime, founded on the principle that technology must be a tool for preventing crime, not for punishing it after its occurrence.

This work defines digital international criminal justice as the right of the victim to benefit from intelligent systems designed specifically to prosecute crimes against humanity in cyberspace, identify those responsible for them, and ensure fair trial, with legal guarantees that protect the rights of the accused from algorithmic bias. This right does not mean the abolition of the court but its transformation into a deterrent reality.

This concept began taking practical shape. In 2024, the International Criminal Court launched a digital platform for collecting cyber evidence from victims directly. In 2025, the United Nations developed a smart system that links all justice mechanisms in a single interactive platform. In developing nations, however, total reliance on traditional models renders them incapable of confronting digital crimes against humanity.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice is not a technical luxury but an existential guarantee for modern justice, and that its absence in international criminal law creates a dangerous vacuum that threatens the stability of the justice system itself.

Chapter Two: The International Criminal Legal Vacuum in Protecting Victims Digitally

Despite the importance of justice, international criminal law still lacks a comprehensive convention that protects the rights of victims in obtaining digital justice. The fundamental Rome conventions, despite recognizing the principle of protecting victims, include no mechanisms for their protection from digital crimes against humanity.

This vacuum is not the result of oversight but a reflection of the conflict of interests between nations that see crime as an individual event and those that see it as a collective threat. At the Conference of States Parties to the Rome Statute in 2025, the Declaration of Digital Justice was adopted, but it contented itself with voluntary cooperation without any legal commitment to protecting victims in cyberspace. The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court has no strategy for digital transformation that includes any mechanism for protecting digital rights of victims.

In judicial forums, the International Court of Justice has not ruled on a single case related to digital international criminal justice despite repeated requests from human rights organizations.

In national courts, cases have begun to emerge. In Canada, a victim filed a lawsuit against the state for neglecting to collect digital evidence in a crime against humanity. In Germany, a national court obligated the state to provide digital mechanisms for protecting victims.

This chapter concludes that the legal vacuum leaves victims without protection and calls for building a new international criminal legal system that balances societal security and the right of the victim in digital justice.

Chapter Three: Traditional Criminal Justice versus Digital Criminal Justice, Re-shaping Criminal Concepts

Digital criminal justice cannot be understood without comparing it to traditional criminal justice, which was built upon concepts such as material evidence and eyewitness testimony. But the modern digital environment challenges all of these concepts.

First, material evidence becomes insufficient if the crime was committed through servers in multiple countries.

Second, eyewitness testimony becomes useless if the crime was committed through smart programs that leave no human trace.

Third, equality among victims collapses in the digital environment, because algorithms may discriminate against certain victims based on biased data.

In this context, some nations have begun formulating new concepts. Finland and the Netherlands invest in preventive digital criminal justice through developing machine learning systems that identify crimes before their occurrence. Singapore adopted interactive criminal platforms that link all authorities in a single system. In developing nations, however, practical application of digital criminal justice faces structural challenges, from the shortage of specialized cadres to the absence of coordination between criminal and digital authorities.

This chapter affirms that digital criminal justice is not a digital copy of traditional justice but a fundamental redefinition of the concept of justice itself in a networked world that knows no borders.

Chapter Four: The Infrastructure of Digital International Criminal Justice, A Missing Criminal Legal Definition

One of the largest gaps in international discourse on digital international criminal justice is the absence of an agreed-upon legal definition of what is called the infrastructure of digital international criminal justice. Without this definition, it is impossible to determine what deserves legal protection or what constitutes a violation of the rights of the victim.

In national jurisprudence, definitions vary enormously. In the United States, the infrastructure of digital international criminal justice includes: digital evidence collection systems, communication platforms between criminal authorities, criminal data bases, and electronic records. In the European Union, the focus is on digital justice systems that integrate transparency and efficiency. In China, it adds to these what it calls interactive justice platforms.

In developing nations, no unified definition exists. Some states consider only electronic records as part of the infrastructure while neglecting evidence collection or communication systems.

This divergence reveals that the absence of an international definition opens the door before subjective interpretations that may be used to justify violations, whether by claiming the system is not criminal or by expanding surveillance under the banner of anything digital. The first step in building an international criminal legal system for digital international criminal justice is agreeing on a precise definition that encompasses: digital evidence collection systems, interactive communication platforms between criminal authorities internationally, unified criminal data bases, systems for determining dynamic committees, and electronic criminal records accessible immediately.

This chapter affirms that the definition is not a technical matter but a political decision that reflects the vision of the international community to its relationship with crime.

Chapter Five: Algorithmic Discrimination in Digital Criminal Justice, Toward an International Criminal Legal Standard

Digital international criminal justice cannot be protected without determining what constitutes an illegitimate algorithmic discrimination in determining the committee. Not every algorithm is a violation against a specific group. Some discrimination may be justified, such as accelerating justice for the elderly. But racial or class-based discrimination is never acceptable.

In international jurisprudence, attempts have begun to establish criteria. In the draft Principles of Digital Criminal Justice, a distinction is drawn between: legitimate discrimination, which considers individual differences to enhance justice; and illegitimate discrimination, which reinforces social or racial biases.

But these principles are not binding; they remain jurisprudential opinions. And the criterion of legitimate discrimination remains ambiguous. Does accelerating justice for the wealthy constitute discrimination? And how does it differ from accelerating justice for developing nations due to algorithmic bias?

In practice, states diverge in application. In 2024, an American court considered an algorithm that gave white justice higher priority to be illegitimate discrimination. In an Asian nation, a court considered accelerating justice for business leaders to be legitimate discrimination due to their economic importance.

This chapter concludes that the international criminal legal standard must focus on intent and impact, not merely on the outcome. An algorithm must be classified as illegitimate discrimination if it aims to marginalize a group from justice without criminal justification, leads to unjustified deprivation of a specific group from justice, or must be classified as illegitimate discrimination regardless of the means of implementation.

Chapter Six: International Criminal Responsibility for Digital Failure, Challenges of Attribution and Oversight

The principle of digital criminal justice cannot be applied without resolving the problem of attribution, that is, determining the authority responsible for the failure of the digital system in collecting evidence or determining the committee. Unlike traditional justice, where the court bears its responsibility directly, justice systems may be developed by private companies, creating ambiguity in responsibility.

International criminal law confronts three levels of attribution. The first level: the system developed by a direct governmental authority. Here responsibility is clear. The second level: the system developed by a private company at the request of the state. Here proof becomes difficult, but the principle of effective oversight may apply. The third level: the system used without official delegation. Here the state bears no responsibility unless it has neglected its duty in oversight.

In 2025, a group of governmental experts affiliated with the United Nations affirmed that the state is responsible for digital justice systems attributed to it in accordance with the principles of international law. But they did not determine how this attribution occurs in the criminal context.

In practice, some states have used the principle of general oversight to hold technology companies responsible for the failure of justice systems, while these companies rejected the linkage on the grounds that the state is the one who set the conditions.

This chapter affirms that the absence of a unified international standard for attribution transforms the digital criminal space into a zone without law, necessitating the creation of an independent international verification body affiliated with the United Nations.

Chapter Seven: Legitimate Responses to Digital Criminal Violations, Between Compensation and Re-trial

When a victim is subjected to a violation in their digital criminal system, what are the means of response available to them? Is it permissible to grant compensation, or to obligate the court with re-trial in response to algorithmic discrimination? This question constitutes one of the most contentious issues in contemporary criminal law.

International criminal law recognizes three types of responses. Administrative measures, such as modifying the system or changing the offending authority. Financial compensation for damage resulting from unjustified deprivation from justice. And re-trial as a penalty for the state's failure to provide fair digital justice.

But when is criminal failure considered grave enough to justify re-trial? In the Principles of Digital International Criminal Justice, the criterion of the lost opportunity was proposed, meaning that the victim would have obtained justice had a fair system been available to them. For example, deprivation of a victim from collecting evidence may be classified as a lost opportunity due to algorithmic bias.

In practice, courts in Northern Europe have granted financial compensations to victims subjected to digital discrimination. In Latin America, courts have obligated the state with re-trial due to failure.

This chapter concludes that the absence of clear legal guidance pushes courts toward reactive decision-making, which may lead to explicit disparities in the protection of criminal rights.

Chapter Eight: Patents of Invention and Digital International Criminal Justice, The Tension Between Innovation and Exploitation, Criminal

One cannot speak of digital international criminal justice without addressing its fundamental tension with the system of patents of invention in criminal matters. Major companies control patents of invention in digital evidence collection systems and interactive platforms, granting them monopolistic authority over justice itself.

The American company Palantir holds patents on more than sixty percent of digital evidence collection systems. The company IBM imposes exorbitant fees on courts that use its platforms, making them unavailable to developing nations.

In practice, these patents have led to: preventing developing nations from developing local justice systems; raising the costs of justice inappropriately; and creating permanent dependence on major companies. In developing nations, the absence of research capabilities further limits their ability to develop national alternatives.

This chapter affirms that genuine digital international criminal justice is not built on dependence on foreign patents but on investment in national scientific research, and that the current patent system must be amended to balance the rights of inventors and the rights of victims in justice.

Chapter Nine: Digital International Criminal Justice in Developing Nations, Challenges of Capacity and Technological Dependence

While major powers possess advanced tools for imposing their digital criminal justice, developing nations face structural challenges that make this right more a slogan than a reality. The absence of technical capabilities, dependence on foreign systems, and the shortage of specialized cadres all limit the ability of these nations to exercise their sovereignty in the field of digital criminal justice.

More than eighty percent of evidence collection systems in developing nations are imported. Most criminal data bases depend on American or European programs. Some nations do not even possess a national data base for crimes.

In this context, some nations have begun taking steps. India launched the National Criminal Systems Project. China created a sovereign criminal data zone. In Africa, regional initiatives have begun to develop early warning systems resistant to bias. In the Arab world, however, most nations encourage digital justice without studying its impact on criminal sovereignty, which may lead to genuine future crises.

This chapter concludes that digital criminal justice in developing nations is not merely a technical matter but a developmental issue requiring long-term investments, regional cooperation, and fair technology transfer.

Chapter Ten: Regional Organization of Digital International Criminal Justice, A Comparative Study of Global Experiences

In the shadow of slowing global mechanisms, regional organization has emerged as a practical solution for enhancing digital international criminal justice among communities with shared interests. Regional bodies can establish binding rules faster than the United Nations.

In Asia, China and India launched the Asian Digital Criminal Justice Initiative, which calls for the exchange of criminal data and the development of shared systems. In Latin America, MERCOSUR nations created a digital criminal response network to confront common attacks.

In the European Union, the Digital Criminal Strategy obligates member states to protect their criminal data and encourages the development of national systems. In Africa, the African Union adopted the Strategy of the Digital Criminal System in 2023, but implementation remains weak due to lack of funding. In the Arab world, the Arab League launched the Strategy of the Digital Criminal System in 2024, calling for the creation of an Arab center for digital criminal justice, but the center was never created, and no joint deterrence mechanisms exist.

This chapter affirms that regional organization is the bridge between national justice and the international system, and that its absence in some regions leaves states prey to external manipulation.

Chapter Eleven: Data and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Criminal Privacy from External Exploitation

Digital international criminal justice cannot be achieved without protecting criminal data for victims. Data, which represents a criminal privacy whose value cannot be estimated, has become today a target for major companies seeking to register patents of invention upon it, granting them monopoly over justice itself.

In Africa, patents of invention were registered on patterns of crimes that communities developed over generations. In Latin America, patents were registered on evidence collection systems after their analysis in foreign laboratories. All these practices constitute what is called criminal piracy, which exploits criminal privacy without fair compensation.

International law faces absence in protecting this data. The International Criminal Court convention does not prevent direct registration of patents on criminal data. Most developing nations do not possess sovereign national criminal data bases, facilitating their exploitation.

In response, some nations have begun enacting national legislation. In India, the Criminal Privacy Law obligates companies to share profits with criminal institutions. In Peru, the constitution recognizes the right of victims to ownership of their criminal data. In the Arab world, most nations still depend on international estimates and do not possess national systems to protect their criminal data.

This chapter affirms that criminal data is not merely scientific information but an expression of the criminal identity of the victim, and that the absence of legal protection transforms criminal privacy into a commodity in the global monopoly market.

Chapter Twelve: Intelligence and Digital International Criminal Justice, When Algorithms Become Judges, Criminal

With the increasing use of artificial intelligence in criminal decision-making, from evidence collection to determining the committee, a new threat to digital international criminal justice has emerged: algorithmic authority. When artificial intelligence systems make decisions that affect the right of the victim to justice without human oversight, the international community loses part of its criminal responsibility.

The problem resides in three points. Opacity: most artificial intelligence algorithms are closed-source criminal, and the victim cannot understand how decisions are made. Bias: these systems may produce recommendations that serve the interests of manufacturing companies, not justice. Independence: some systems learn autonomously and may make decisions that contradict international criminal policies.

In practice, artificial intelligence systems led to dangerous violations. In an Asian nation, an early warning algorithm about crises was rejected because it did not generate sufficient profits. In an African nation, artificial intelligence systems recommended using foreign surveillance technologies instead of local systems, leading to the erosion of the national criminal industry entirely.

To confront this challenge, some nations have begun establishing controls. In the European Union, the Artificial Intelligence Law obligates companies to disclose how their highest-risk systems operate. In China, the Code of Ethics for Criminal Artificial Intelligence obligates governmental bodies to conduct impact assessments before using any smart system. In the Arab world, most nations remain in early stages of regulating artificial intelligence in criminal justice, and no legislation exists to protect criminal sovereignty from use not subject to oversight of these technologies.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice in the age of artificial intelligence does not mean preventing technology but imposing transparency and accountability on whoever develops and uses it.

Chapter Thirteen: Crimes and Digital International Criminal Justice, Combating Electronic Crimes, Criminal, Digital Financial

Digital international criminal justice cannot be protected without confronting electronic crimes that target victims and financial institutions across borders. Hacking of bank accounts of victims, theft of digital criminal identities, spreading malware in surveillance systems, all these crimes threaten financial stability, but they remain outside the scope of justice due to the absence of effective international cooperation.

Estimates indicate that global losses from criminal electronic crimes exceeded twenty billion dollars annually, yet conviction rates do not exceed one percent in many nations. This is due to: the difficulty of identifying the perpetrator, as attacks are launched through servers in multiple countries; the absence of binding treaties, as the Budapest Convention on Combating Electronic Crimes has not been ratified by more than sixty-eight nations and does not include the most important Asian and African countries; and differences in legislation, as what constitutes a crime in one nation may be legitimate in another.

In response, some regional initiatives have begun. In the European Union, the Unified European Law for Electronic Crimes obligates member states to exchange information in real time. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN countries launched a regional strategy for combating criminal cybercrimes. In the Arab world, some nations have acceded to the Budapest Convention while others call for a special Arab convention, which has not yet been concluded. The absence of joint implementation mechanisms also limits the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

This chapter concludes that combating criminal electronic crimes is not merely a security matter but a practical test of states' commitment to the principle of digital international criminal justice, because the absence of justice encourages criminals to target nations with weak protection.

Chapter Fourteen: Digital Education and Digital International Criminal Justice, Building Social Awareness as a Foundation for Criminal Defense

Digital international criminal justice cannot be achieved without building social awareness among victims and citizens about the dangers of cyberspace and their duties toward it. Victims are not merely victims of attacks but partners in the justice process. The absence of digital criminal education makes them vulnerable to exploitation, facilitates the hacking of their systems, and threatens the national criminal infrastructure in its entirety.

In advanced nations, digital criminal education has become part of training programs. In the Netherlands, victims learn how to recognize fake criminal platforms. In Singapore, the Digital Criminal Citizenship Program is taught in all institutions and includes concepts such as privacy, security, and social responsibility.

In developing nations, digital criminal education is often limited to the elite or presented through limited media campaigns. This creates a digital gap within the criminal society itself, where the ordinary victim is unable to protect their data or distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources. In the Arab world, some nations have begun introducing criminal cyber security concepts into training programs, but they remain optional and non-systematic. In other nations, no national strategy for digital criminal education exists to this day.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice is not the sole responsibility of the state but a partnership between the state and the criminal society, and that investment in digital criminal education is cheaper and more effective than building expensive firewalls.

Chapter Fifteen: Scientific Research and Digital International Criminal Justice, Toward National Criminal Technological Independence

No nation can practice its digital criminal justice in a genuinely effective manner without possessing local research capabilities in the fields of criminal cyber security, criminal artificial intelligence, and digital system design. Total dependence on foreign technology makes the state vulnerable to blackmail or disruption at any moment.

Major powers have recognized this truth early. In the United States, the Advanced Criminal Research Projects Office allocates tens of billions of dollars annually to research projects in criminal cyber security. In China, the Smart Justice System Plan 2030 allocates a significant portion of its budget to developing local smart surveillance systems. In developing nations, digital criminal scientific research suffers from lack of funding, weakness of infrastructure, and brain drain, creating a vicious circle where the absence of research leads to dependence on the outside, which in turn discourages investment in research.

In the Arab world, some nations have begun creating specialized research centers, such as King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, which includes a unit for criminal cyber security. In other nations, research focuses on commercial applications rather than technological foundations.

This chapter concludes that criminal technological independence is not a luxury but an existential condition for digital international criminal justice, and that nations that do not invest today in criminal scientific research will not be digitally prosperous tomorrow.

Chapter Sixteen: Bilateral Agreements and Digital International Criminal Justice, Can Small Nations Protect Themselves?

In the absence of a comprehensive international convention, many nations have turned to concluding bilateral agreements for digital criminal cooperation. But these agreements are often unequal because major nations impose their conditions on the weaker party.

In some agreements, major nations demand from the other party permission to access their criminal data in cases of criminal emergencies, without a precise definition of the nature of emergencies. In other agreements, small nations are obligated to use equipment or programs from a company affiliated with the major nation, creating long-term dependence.

In contrast, some medium-sized nations have succeeded in concluding balanced agreements. Between two Asian nations, a joint committee for investigating criminal cyber incidents was created, enjoying full independence. Between two African nations, the principle of non-interference was agreed upon, with clear deterrence mechanisms. In the Arab world, most bilateral agreements in the digital criminal field remain secret, and their texts are not published for public opinion. This limits parliaments' ability to review them and prevents civil society from holding governments accountable.

This chapter affirms that bilateral agreements are not an alternative to the international system but a temporary means, and that small nations must cooperate among themselves to build a negotiating bloc capable of imposing fair conditions.

Chapter Seventeen: Courts and Digital International Criminal Justice, Toward Digital Criminal Judicial Jurisdiction

Rights cannot be protected in the digital criminal space without effective judicial mechanisms. But determining the competent court in criminal cybercrimes constitutes a significant challenge, because the crime may be committed from one nation through servers in a second nation and affect a victim in a third nation.

National legislations have adopted several criteria for determining jurisdiction. The principle of the place where damage occurs, the most common but difficult to apply when damage is global. The principle of the perpetrator's nationality, impractical if the perpetrator is unknown. The principle of the location of the server, where servers may be in nations that have no relation to the crime.

In practice, this ambiguity led to conflicting rulings. A court in a Western nation issued a ruling imprisoning a citizen from an Asian nation for hacking a governmental criminal system, while a court in his nation refused to extradite him on the grounds that the act is not locally criminalized. In the European Union, jurisdiction rules were unified through the European List for Criminal Electronic Crimes, which obligates member states to mutually recognize rulings. In other nations, courts still lack the necessary technical expertise to understand digital criminal evidence. In the Arab world, most legislations do not clearly determine the court competent for criminal cybercrimes, leading to delays in justice or the dropping of cases.

This chapter concludes that the absence of a unified digital criminal judicial system encourages criminals to exploit legal gaps, necessitating the creation of an international criminal cyber court affiliated with the United Nations.

Chapter Eighteen: Data and Digital International Criminal Justice, Between Individual Ownership and Collective Sovereignty

Criminal data today constitutes the most valuable resource in the digital criminal economy. Digital international criminal justice cannot be complete without determining who has the right to control this data: the victim or the state or the company?

In modern jurisprudence, three schools have emerged. The individual ownership school, which holds that the victim is the sole owner of their data and has the right to prevent its collection or sale. The collective sovereignty school, which holds that data is a national resource and the state has the right to organize its use to protect the public interest. The joint ownership school, which seeks to balance individual right and collective interest.

In application, Europe adopted an approach close to individual ownership through the General Data Protection Regulation, which grants victims the right to delete their data or export it. China adopted the collective sovereignty approach, where data is considered a tool for national development. The United States adopted the market approach, where data is organized through sectoral laws without a general framework. In the Arab world, some nations have issued laws for the protection of criminal data but lack enforcement mechanisms. In other nations, no legislation exists to regulate this field to this day.

This chapter affirms that criminal data is not merely numbers but an expression of individual and collective criminal identity, and that genuine digital international criminal justice begins with respecting the victim's right to control their information.

Chapter Nineteen: Social Justice and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Societies from Irresponsible Criminal Technologies

Digital international criminal justice cannot be separated from social justice, because some digital criminal technologies may lead to long-term social damage. Smart evidence collection systems may have neglected poor victims. Digital platforms may have promoted ineffective justice. Criminal data may have been used for discrimination against specific categories.

In practice, some digital criminal projects led to significant social damage. In an Asian nation, smart evidence collection systems led to the neglect of victims in rural areas. In an African nation, digital platforms led to the spread of expensive justice at the expense of local solutions.

International law faces absence in regulating this dimension. No international agreements exist regulating the social impact of digital criminal technologies. Most contracts between states and companies remain secret and are not subject to criminal oversight. No international standards exist for responsible digital justice. In response, some nations have begun enacting legislation. In Denmark, smart evidence collection systems are required to cover all categories without discrimination. In Costa Rica, the issuance of new licenses for digital criminal platforms was halted until their social impact is evaluated. In the Arab world, most nations encourage digital justice without studying its social impact, which may lead to genuine future crises.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice must extend to protecting social justice, and that criminal technologies must be built on the principle of responsibility from design.

Chapter Twenty: The Future and Digital International Criminal Justice, Toward a Model International Convention

After a comprehensive review of challenges and experiences, it becomes clear that digital international criminal justice is not a choice but an existential necessity in the digital age. To achieve it at the international level, it is proposed to prepare a model international convention on digital international criminal justice, including the following:

First, a unified definition of digital international criminal justice as the right of the victim to benefit from intelligent systems designed specifically to prosecute crimes against humanity in cyberspace, with guarantees protecting the rights of the accused from algorithmic bias.

Second, a unified list of the infrastructure of digital international criminal justice, including the fundamental systems: evidence collection, communication platforms, data bases, committee determination systems, and electronic records.

Third, the prohibition of illegitimate algorithmic discrimination in determining the committee, with a precise definition of discrimination as any algorithm that aims to marginalize a group from justice without criminal justification.

Fourth, unified criteria for attribution, allowing nations to determine responsibility precisely, with the creation of an independent international verification body affiliated with the United Nations.

Fifth, mechanisms for legitimate responses, determining when compensation may be granted or the court obligated with re-trial in response to digital failure.

Sixth, states' commitment to protecting criminal data and respecting the rights of victims in privacy.

Seventh, encouraging regional cooperation through the creation of regional criminal cyber response networks.

Eighth, supporting developing nations through technology transfer and capacity building.

Ninth, the creation of an international criminal cyber court that adjudicates disputes related to digital international criminal justice.

Tenth, periodic review of the convention to keep pace with technological developments.

This chapter concludes by reminding us that digital criminal justice is not the end of history but the beginning of a new stage in the evolution of criminal law, balancing efficiency, right and justice in digital governance, technology and innovation, the state and human dignity.

Chapter Twenty-One: Smart Contracts and Digital International Criminal Justice, When Algorithms Become Witness and Judge

The concept of the criminal contract is no longer confined to paper and witnesses. It has extended to encompass smart contracts that execute themselves automatically when conditions are met. Justice through the smart contract is not merely execution but automatic execution of predetermined conditions that the victim may not perceive when presenting evidence.

In practice, some nations have begun experimenting with smart contracts. In Estonia, victims are allowed to determine conditions of evidence collection automatically in their digital contract. In the Emirates, the Smart Justice Platform allows victims to determine conditions of evidence collection in advance.

In developing nations, however, the concept of the smart contract remains strange, increasing cases of unjust justice.

This chapter affirms that the smart contract is not a luxury but a legal necessity, and that its absence transforms justice into an ineffective decision, not a responsible one.

Chapter Twenty-Two: Criminal Energy and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Resources from Digital Extraction

With the increasing dependence on energy in modern courts, from cooling systems to criminal data centers, electricity consumption has become part of criminal strategy. Criminal data centers consume enormous quantities of electricity and have been used as tools of pressure on nations with limited resources.

In a small nation, the concentration of foreign criminal data centers may lead to the extraction of the national electrical grid, affecting basic services. In cases of conflict, these centers may be shut down abruptly, causing significant criminal losses for the host nation.

International law faces absence in regulating this dimension. No international agreements exist regulating energy consumption in digital criminal activities. Most contracts between states and companies remain secret and are not subject to parliamentary oversight. No international standards exist for energy efficiency in digital criminal centers. In response, some nations have begun imposing conditions. In Denmark, criminal data centers are required to use renewable energy. In Singapore, the issuance of new licenses for criminal data centers was halted until 2026 due to pressure on the electrical grid. In the Arab world, most nations encourage the creation of criminal data centers without studying their impact on national resources, which may lead to future energy crises.

This chapter concludes that digital international criminal justice must include the management of natural resources used in digital criminal activities, and that electrical energy has become part of national criminal security.

Chapter Twenty-Three: Safety of Victims and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Victims from Digital Manipulation

Digital international criminal justice cannot be separated from protecting the safety of victims. With the increasing use of digital platforms in presenting criminal services, these platforms have become targets for attacks aimed at changing conditions, forging data, or spreading misleading information about financial changes concerning victims.

In 2024, a criminal research platform was hacked in a European nation, leading to the change of data of monetary reserves. In 2025, misleading information about financial crises was spread through artificial intelligence platforms, leading to unjustified popular panic.

International law faces absence in protecting this sector. No international agreements exist regulating the safety of criminal research. Most digital platforms are not subject to sufficient criminal oversight. No international standards exist for the transparency of information in digital criminal matters. In response, some nations have begun enacting legislation. In the European Union, the Law of Safety of Criminal Research obligates platforms to publish accurate and updated information. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Council began examining the algorithms that determine information. In the Arab world, most legislations do not cover digital threats to the safety of victims, and no effective mechanisms exist to prevent digital manipulation.

This chapter affirms that the safety of victims in the field of digital international criminal justice is not a luxury but a fundamental human right, and that the safety of criminal research must be considered part of national criminal security.

Chapter Twenty-Four: Education and Digital International Criminal Justice, Building Digital Criminal Social Awareness as a Foundation for Defending Rights

Digital international criminal justice cannot be achieved without building social awareness among victims and citizens about their digital rights and their duties toward the general financial system. Digital criminal education is not merely the dissemination of information but empowering citizens to demand their rights and participate in making criminal decisions.

In nations where digital criminal law is taught in schools, awareness of the rights of coming generations in clean financial systems increases. In communities trained to cope with cyber threats, criminal losses decrease. In practice, some nations have begun integrating the digital criminal system into educational curricula. In Finland, children learn from the sixth grade how to protect their criminal data. In Costa Rica, education for the sake of the digital criminal system is a fundamental part of the educational system.

In developing nations, digital criminal education is often limited to the elite or presented through limited media campaigns. This creates a gap in awareness that deprives citizens of understanding their rights. In the Arab world, some nations have begun introducing digital criminal system concepts into secondary curricula, but they remain optional and non-systematic.

This chapter affirms that digital criminal education is a strategic investment in justice, and that nations that do not invest in it will remain unable to demand their rights.

Chapter Twenty-Five: Criminal Heritage and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Heritage from Digital Extinction

Digital change is not confined to the economy or the financial system. It also threatens criminal heritage for humanity. The transformation to the digital criminal system may lead to the extinction of traditional knowledge, the collapse of local criminal practices, and the collapse of traditional criminal communities.

In Africa, smart surveillance systems threaten traditional criminal practices that communities developed over generations. In Latin America, dependence on digital procedures leads to the erosion of traditional criminal skills. Some languages may even become extinct due to digital transformation, and criminal customs may disappear because of it.

International law faces absence in protecting this dimension. Cultural heritage conventions do not take digital threats into consideration. And yet, the UNESCO organization has begun classifying digital risk as a reason for listing criminal sites on the risk list. In developing nations, the absence of resources limits their ability to protect their criminal heritage from digital threats.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice includes cultural heritage as part of national identity, and that the absence of legal protection for this dimension transforms peoples into witnesses to the extinction of their criminal history.

Chapter Twenty-Six: Criminal Financing and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Developing Nations from Digital Criminal Debts

With the increasing need for digital criminal financing, a new danger has emerged: the transformation of digital criminal debts into a tool for exploitation. Some developing nations borrow billions of dollars to finance digital criminal projects, but find themselves unable to repay due to financial crises that strike their economies.

In the Cape Verde islands, financial crises led to the collapse of criminal revenues, making the repayment of digital criminal loans impossible. In Latin America, financial crises led to the collapse of revenues, increasing budget deficits.

International law faces absence in protecting these nations. No mechanisms exist for debt relief in cases of financial crises. Most digital criminal loans come with conditions stricter than the burden of debt. No international standards exist for fair digital criminal financing. In response, some initiatives have begun. At the International Monetary Fund conference in 2025, a mechanism for restructuring criminal debts was proposed, but it has not been adopted since. In the Group of Seven, the initiative for fair digital criminal financing is still under discussion. In the Arab world, most nations depend on external loans to finance digital system projects without the existence of legal guarantees to protect them from financial risks.

This chapter concludes that digital criminal financing must be a gift, not a debt, and that nations should not pay the price of others' mistakes that burden them with the weight of debt.

Chapter Twenty-Seven: Criminal Transport and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Supply Chains from Cyber Threats

Criminal transport no longer depends only on courts and mail. It depends on complex digital systems that manage supply chains from the central court to the consumer. The hacking of these systems may lead to the loss of criminal resources, the delay of distribution, or the theft of shipments.

In 2024, a tracking system for criminal shipments was hacked in a European nation, leading to the loss of thousands of criminal resources that caused the delay of cooling. In 2025, shipments of criminal resources were stolen through the hacking of digital port systems.

International law faces absence in classifying digital criminal supply chains as part of compensable damage despite their strategic importance. In developing nations, the absence of resources limits their ability to rebuild supply chains after attacks.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice in the field of transport is not a technical matter but a criminal security matter, and that digital criminal supply chains must be considered part of vital infrastructure.

Chapter Twenty-Eight: Scientific Research and Digital International Criminal Justice, The Balance Between Open Criminal Cooperation and Protection

Scientific progress cannot be achieved in confronting criminal challenges without the exchange of knowledge. But this exchange must occur within limits that protect national interests. The publication of sensitive criminal research data, such as models of resistant financial change, may be used against developing nations in international negotiations.

In some cases, industrial nations have used the criminal data that developing nations provided to impose unfair commercial conditions. Some private companies even purchase this data and resell it at exorbitant prices.

International law faces the challenge of balancing between the right of the scientific community to access knowledge and the right of the state to protect its criminal data from exploitation. In developing nations, the absence of clear policies makes their researchers vulnerable to exploitation without fair compensation.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice in scientific research means establishing clear classifications for data, determining what may be published and what must be protected, without scientific isolation.

Chapter Twenty-Nine: International Cooperation and Digital International Criminal Justice, Toward a Fair Global System for Digital Criminal Governance

No nation can protect its digital criminal justice alone, because threats cross borders. International cooperation is therefore not a choice but a necessity. But this cooperation must be fair, not a tool for the hegemony of industrial nations.

In international forums, digital criminal system standards are often imposed by industrial nations without regard for the capabilities of developing nations. This creates an unfair system that reinforces digital criminal subordination.

The solution requires: creating a neutral international forum for crafting the rules of digital international criminal justice; providing financial and technical support for developing nations; and respecting diversity in national models for digital criminal justice. In the Arab world, regional coordination remains weak, limiting the ability of nations to negotiate as a single bloc.

This chapter concludes that the global system for digital criminal governance must be built on the principle of shared justice, not digital criminal hegemony.

Chapter Thirty: Law and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Civilians in Criminal Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law

With the increasing use of criminal resources as weapons in conflicts, a fundamental question has emerged: does the destruction of digital criminal infrastructure constitute a violation of international humanitarian law as a war tool? And is deliberate causing of financial crisis considered a war crime?

In some conflicts, digital cooling systems for courts were destroyed, leading to their loss. In other cases, distribution platforms were hacked to force populations to flee. All these acts caused long-term criminal damage.

In the Tallinn Manual 2.0 project, it was affirmed that the destruction of criminal infrastructure as a war tool constitutes a violation of humanitarian law. But practical application remains difficult due to the ambiguity of intent and the difficulty of proving the causal relationship. In the International Criminal Court, the crime of destruction of criminal infrastructure remains under discussion and has not yet been classified in the basic system.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice does not mean abandoning humanity in times of war, but rather strengthening the protection of civilians from digital criminal weapons.

Chapter Thirty-One: Space and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Earth from Criminal Space Pollution

With the increasing space activities related to the financial system, from industrial satellites for monitoring courts to space drones for distributing resources, a new threat has emerged: space pollution that affects criminal systems. The crash of industrial satellites may obstruct criminal monitoring systems, while rockets that affect the atmospheric envelope may organize criminal communications.

In practice, private companies plan to launch thousands of satellites during the coming decade for monitoring criminal resources, without any international environmental regulation. And yet, the Outer Space Treaty does not take into consideration the criminal impacts of these activities.

International law faces a fundamental problematic: is space pollution part of digital criminal responsibility? And should space companies be subject to the same rules that apply to terrestrial industries? In developing nations, the absence of capacity to access space makes them unable to participate in crafting these rules, despite their direct impact by space pollution.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice must extend to outer space, and that criminal space activities must be subject to the principle of criminal precaution, like any other industrial activity.

Chapter Thirty-Two: Intelligence and Digital International Criminal Justice, When Fake News Becomes a Criminal Weapon

With the emergence of generative artificial intelligence, it has become possible for any entity to create illusory content, from images to audio clips to videos that appear entirely real. This technology is used today as a digital weapon to mislead the public, shake public trust, and undermine trust in national criminal systems.

In 2025, fake videos were circulated warning victims of secure national systems, leading to the decline of trust in the criminal system and the spread of misleading information. In criminal crises, false news about shortages in basic criminal resources was published, leading to popular panic and an unjustified increase in prices.

International law faces difficulty in dealing with this phenomenon. Fake content is not classified as a criminal cyber attack according to current definitions. The creator of the content may be a program, not a person. The content is published through cross-border platforms that are not subject to the oversight of the targeted nation. In response, some nations have begun establishing controls. In the European Union, the Artificial Intelligence Law obligates companies to place a digital watermark on all algorithmically generated content. In the United States, the Transparency in Social Media Law criminalizes the use of fake content in criminal misleading campaigns. In the Arab world, most legislations do not cover this type of threat despite the increasing use of it against national criminal systems.

This chapter concludes that the absence of regulation of generative artificial intelligence transforms the digital space into an arena of criminal psychological war, requiring a new definition of criminal cyber intervention that includes malicious impact through fake content.

Chapter Thirty-Three: Data and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Sovereignty from Digital Exploitation, Big Data

With the increasing dependence on big data in analyzing the financial system, this data has become a strategic resource. But developing nations often lack the capacity to collect and analyze their data, resorting to foreign companies that possess these capabilities.

In some cases, private companies have used criminal data from a developing nation to develop predictive models sold at exorbitant prices. Some governments even used this data to impose unfair commercial conditions.

International law faces absence in protecting this data. No international agreements exist regulating the ownership of criminal data. Most contracts between states and companies remain secret. No standards exist for digital criminal sovereignty. In developing nations, the absence of legislation permits the exploitation of their data without fair compensation.

This chapter affirms that criminal data is not merely numbers but a tool for justice, and that nations that do not protect their digital sovereignty will remain unable to demand their criminal rights.

Chapter Thirty-Four: Higher Education and Digital International Criminal Justice, Toward National Colleges for Criminal Law, Digital, Criminal

National digital criminal capabilities cannot be built without specialized educational institutions that produce qualified cadres. Dependence on foreign expertise or short courses is not sufficient to confront complex threats. The creation of national colleges for digital criminal law is therefore a strategic investment in digital international criminal justice.

In leading nations, these colleges have become centers for research and development. At Harvard University, international digital criminal law is taught. At Oxford University, the Criminal Law Center trains lawyers on raising digital criminal cases. In developing nations, digital criminal education is often part of computer science departments without sufficient specialization. This produces graduates capable of programming but not qualified to understand the legal aspects or the strategy of digital criminal security. In the Arab world, some nations have begun creating specialized programs, such as a Master's in Digital Criminal Security at universities in the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. But in other nations, curricula still lack updating, and no sufficient links exist between universities and the industry sector.

This chapter concludes that higher education is not merely a means for qualifying individuals but a tool for building a national digital criminal identity, and that nations that do not invest in digital criminal law colleges will remain importers of knowledge, not producers of it.

Chapter Thirty-Five: Digital Culture and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Local Criminal Creativity from Piracy and Marginalization

The digital space is not confined to data and services. It also encompasses criminal cultural creativity: documentary films, novels, arts, and visual arts that tell the stories of the financial system. With the domination of global platforms on content distribution, local creators have become vulnerable to marginalization or exploitation.

Broadcasting platforms may pay meager compensations to local creators or refuse to display their content without justification. Their works may even be stolen and attributed to others without sufficient legal protection. In response, some nations have begun enacting legislation to protect local content. In France, the law obligates the existence of a specific proportion of French content on platforms. In South Korea, the state invested in supporting local digital content, leading to its global spread. In the Arab world, efforts remain fragmented, and no effective national policies exist to support local criminal digital creativity or protect it from piracy.

This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice includes cultural heritage as part of national identity, and that its absence transforms peoples into passive consumers, not active creators.

Chapter Thirty-Six: Digital Financing and Digital International Criminal Justice, Protecting Criminal Currencies from Manipulation and Occupation

With the emergence of digital criminal currencies and blockchain, traditional financial systems have become facing new challenges. Digital criminal currencies can be used for money laundering under the cover of criminal projects or for financing illusory projects.

In practice, occupation operations in the market of digital criminal currencies led to losses estimated in billions of dollars. And yet, legal regulation for this market remains weak in many nations.

International law faces difficulty in dealing with digital criminal currencies because they are not subject to the authority of a single state and their owners cannot be easily tracked. In developing nations, the absence of regulation permits the exploitation of these currencies for stealing criminal financing intended for real projects.

This chapter concludes that digital international criminal justice in the financial field does not mean preventing innovation but establishing controls that protect the national economy from uncalculated risks.

Chapter Thirty-Seven: Scientific Research and Digital International Criminal Justice, The Balance Between Open Criminal Cooperation and Protection

Scientific progress cannot be achieved in confronting criminal challenges without the exchange of knowledge. But this exchange must occur within limits that protect national interests. The publication of sensitive criminal research data, such as models of resistant financial change, may be used against developing nations in international negotiations.

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This chapter affirms that digital international criminal justice does not mean abandoning humanity in times of war, but rather strengthening the protection of civilians from digital criminal weapons.

Chapter Forty: Digital International Criminal Justice and the Future, A Strategic Vision for Coming Decades

At the conclusion, digital criminal justice cannot be viewed as a temporary phenomenon but as a fundamental transformation in the concept of criminal protection in the twenty-first century. Nations that adopt digital international criminal justice today will be capable of: protecting their citizens from digital criminal manipulation; building an independent and sustainable digital criminal economy; enhancing the position of their generations in the global criminal system; and participating actively in crafting the rules of the new international system.

Nations that ignore this transformation will find themselves hostage to foreign technology, exposed to external interventions, and incapable of protecting their interests in the digital age. Investment in digital international criminal justice is therefore not a question of choice but a question of survival.

Conclusion

After a comprehensive review of the dimensions of digital international criminal justice across all fields, from cyber security to economy to culture to development, it becomes clear that this concept was never a technical luxury but an existential guarantee for the modern state. The digital criminal space, despite its non-material nature, has become an arena for political and economic conflicts, and no state can maintain its sovereignty over its criminal administration without effective national digital capabilities.

This work has revealed that the legislative vacuum constitutes a double threat: it allows major companies and states to impose their dominance, and it leaves developing nations exposed to exploitation without legal protection. To fill this vacuum, a collective initiative is necessary to build a fair international system that balances criminal innovation and state sovereignty over their systems.

In the end, genuine digital international criminal justice is not built on isolation or repression but on transparency, efficiency, and trust between the state and citizens. It is not an end in itself but a means to build a safe criminal future, just and humane.

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Praise be to God, and with Him lies all success.

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